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A LEGAL PLURALIST APPROACH TO MIGRATION
CONTROL: NORM COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBALIZED
WORLD
Jenny Poon *
ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a new approach to international cooperation on
migration control. More specifically, it proposes a legal pluralist understanding
of refugee law, which would explain and capture the relations and interactions
between different legal orders and legal regimes. This Article suggests that State
and non-State entities maintain an ongoing dialectical exchange that helps to
further legitimize and incentivize compliance as well as encourage more
dialogue on the compliance of legal norms. Norm formation and compliance
may be done through these mutual dialectical exchanges between State and nonState entities, which has the effect of legitimizing legal norms, furthering norm
compliance, and promoting additional dialectical exchanges. Third country
agreements, such as the EU-Turkey Agreement and the Italy-Libya
Memorandum of Understanding, will be used as examples.
INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly globalized world, cooperative migration controls have
become the new norm. Cooperative migration control may take many forms, but
with the same aim of deterring claimants from reaching the shores of sovereign
territories to claim asylum. 1 An example of cooperative migration control may
take the form of agreements with third countries where, in the European Union
(EU) context, claimants are sent towards a non-EU country deemed “safe.” 2

*
Jenny Poon, B.A. (Hons), J.D., LL.M., is a Ph.D. candidate from the Faculty of Law at Western
University. She was previously a Visiting Fellow at the University of Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre
and a Visiting Researcher at the Max Planck Institute of Comparative Public Law and International Law.
Her research focuses on access to justice in Europe and the principle of non-refoulement as it is interpreted
and applied in the Common European Asylum System. Her research interests include refugee law, human
rights, and migration control. The author wishes to thank Dr. Valerie Oosterveld for helpful comments
on a previous draft, and Dr. Ryan Liss for revision comments on her doctoral thesis.
1
James Hathaway & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative
Deterrence 106 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Working Paper, 2014).
2
Jenny Poon, Non-Refoulement Obligations in EU Third Country Agreements, EUROPEAN
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Many of these third country agreements are negotiated and signed on the basis
of fighting “irregular” migration or protecting territorial integrity. 3 States are
continuously establishing new measures to fight “irregular” migration, including
using mechanisms suggested by some scholars to be deterrence measures in an
effort to discourage asylum claimants from entering a State’s territory. 4 While
international law places limits upon States to ensure compliance with minimum
standards, often States are permitted to determine how they will implement the
international standards into domestic law.
This Article explores how a nuanced understanding of norm compliance may
potentially inform a new approach to viewing international cooperation on
migration control. Given the multiplicity of actors involved in a migration
control scenario and the complexities of each of their roles—especially the
difficulty in determining complicity—it is important to examine the underlying
reasons for and against State compliance, and what motivates State behavior.
This Article will begin by positioning a legal pluralist understanding of refugee
law. Next, traditional international law and international relations theories on
compliance will be discussed, including the reasons and relevance for a legal
pluralist understanding of compliance. The third and final section of the Article
will examine how a legal pluralist approach to refugee law may inform a new
understanding of international cooperation on migration control.
I.

SETTING THE STAGE: A LEGAL PLURALIST UNDERSTANDING OF
REFUGEE LAW

A legal pluralist approach to refugee law explains and captures the relations
and interactions between different legal orders (for example, international and
European law; European and national law) and different legal regimes (human
rights law and refugee law). 5 In an increasingly globalized world—with the
multiplicity of actors involved and the interplay between different legal orders
and legal regimes—determining complicity for the acts and omissions of such

DATABASE OF ASYLUM LAW, 2018.
3
See, e.g., EU-Turkey Statement, European Council (Mar. 18, 2016); Libya-EU Memorandum of
Understanding, Council of the European Union (Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Italy-Libya MOU].
4
Hathaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 1.
5
For a discussion of other approaches to constructive human rights pluralism, see generally
Cathryn Costello, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration Detention under
International Human Rights and EU Law, 19 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 19, 2012, at 257–303. See also
Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories: An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking, OXFORD UNIV.
PRESS, 2016; Galina Cornelisse, Legal Pluralism in the European Regulation of Border Control, RES.
HANDBOOKS IN EUROPEAN LAW, 2018, at 373–91.
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actors becomes difficult. Different actors with distinct roles present themselves
on the international stage with different interests and agendas. These actors may
include: nongovernmental organizations; non-State actors, such as international
organizations, States, and State agents; and State-like entities, such as
transnational corporations. While each actor may be distinct and play different
roles, a legal pluralist approach to refugee law and international cooperation on
migration control suggest that these actors and their roles are intertwined.
Further, and as a result of the tensions between these actors, a theory that
explains how and why States are increasingly incentivized to cooperate
internationally on migration control issues may potentially reveal protection
gaps. 6 A theory explaining State behavior may potentially point to areas where
the law may need to be reformed or clarified. This revelation may lead to more
informed policies in enhancing the protection standards of asylum claimants and
refugees affected by migration control policies.
Legal pluralism is already present in refugee law. Although some scholars
may argue that refugee law is unique in that it gives deference to national courts
and decision-makers to determine whether to grant or reject refugee status to an
individual seeking asylum in a territory, refugee law itself may be regarded as a
combination of administrative law, human rights law, civil procedure, and
international law. 7 Refugee law is, therefore, not a self-contained regime.
Complicating the pluralism further is the fact that different jurisdictions take
different approaches to the implementation of international refugee law into
domestic law. Some are monist and automatically incorporate the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention), while others are dualist
and must transform the Refugee Convention through domestic legislation. 8
There may be tensions between these two types of implementation. There may
also be tensions between the way in which States interpret international law. For
example, some States may consider refugee law to be lex specialis, displacing
human rights law in order for refugee law norms to take precedence. 9 Despite
6
See generally KIRSTEN MCCONNACHIE, GOVERNING REFUGEES: JUSTICE, ORDER AND LEGAL
PLURALISM, (Routledge, 2014).
7
However, it has been contended by some scholars that the human rights treaty regime is a “selfcontained” regime. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: SelfContained Regimes in International Law, 17(3) EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 483, 483–529 (2006). See also
U.N. GAOR, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law ¶ 159–164, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (July 18, 2006). See generally
Eckart Klein, Self-Contained Regime, OXFORD PUBLIC INT’L L. (2006).
8
For a discussion on monist and dualist traditions, see generally JOHN H. CURRIE ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND THEORY (Irwin Law 2d. ed. 2014).
9
Jenny Poon, Non-Refoulement in the International Refugee Law Regime: A Lex Specialis? 3
CORNELL INT’L L.J. ONLINE, 31–33 (2017).

POON_3.2.20

2040

3/4/2020 11:33 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

these tensions, legal pluralism explains the underlying reasons as to why and
how different jurisdictions coexist alongside one another and can work together.
The theory of legal pluralism may be applied to refugee law in specific and
concrete ways. For example, the legal pluralist approach to refugee law may
affect one’s interpretation of the ongoing phenomenon between State
compliance and non-compliance with international refugee law norms such as
non-refoulement. 10 A State’s compliance or lack of compliance with nonrefoulement may affect the status of the norm. For example, non-refoulement is
considered by many to be customary international law. 11 However, this status as
customary international law depends, in part, on State practice. The fact that
State practice differs between States can, prima facie, call into question the
status of the norm. However, legal pluralism brings nuance into this questioning.
Under a legal pluralistic approach, divergence among these legal orders and
legal regimes may be positive where higher standards are applied by a different
legal order, thus protection for stakeholders may accordingly also be increased. 12
In other words, the existence of higher standards may reinforce non-refoulement
as a customary norm. The recognition of the extraterritorial scope and
application of non-refoulement is an affirmation of the position taken by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as an
affirmation of non-refoulement beyond the treaty norm. 13
II. EFFECT OF NORMS: FORMATION, INTERPRETATION, COMPLIANCE,
AND ENFORCEMENT

As stated earlier, a legal pluralist approach to refugee law may inform one’s
understanding of State behavior, which may potentially assist in identifying
protection gaps in international cooperation on migration control scenarios.
Compliance theories examine the underlying reasons for State behavior,
analyzing why States comply or do not comply with certain legal norms. The
section below sets out different compliance theories and explains how a legal

10
Some scholars have suggested that the approach to State compliance with the principle of nonrefoulement itself may be contentious, citing different approaches to implementation of the international
law norm to domestic practice. See Ellen D’Angelo, Non-Refoulement: The Search for a Consistent
Interpretation of Article 33, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 279–315 (2009).
11
See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement,
THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Nov. 1997).
12
Cathryn Costello, Human Rights of Migrants in European Law, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS (2016).
13
See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of
Non-Refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY (2007).
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pluralist understanding of refugee law is distinct from traditional compliance
models and how it may inform a new way of understanding international
cooperation on migration control.
According to scholars, States comply with international law, not through
coercion, but through a cooperative model whereby States interact through
justification, discourse, and persuasion. 14 Yet others have suggested that
transnational legal processes explain the reasons for and against State
compliance with international law. For instance, Professor Harold Koh has
suggested that the interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international
law norms into domestic legal structures provide a thick explanation of
compliance with international obligations. 15 This Article suggests instead that a
legal pluralist approach to refugee law may inform a new interpretation of
international cooperation on migration control. For instance, while the theory of
transnational legal processes contends that States comply with international law
norms as a result of transnational interactions that help to constitute the identity
of a State where transnational actors act and react through a series of
interactions, this Article suggests that international law is a function of not just
State-to-State interactions, but dialogues between and among non-State actors,
transnational corporations and entities, and international organizations through
local, national, regional, and international levels. 16 Further, this dialogue is
contrary to the traditional notion that international law decision-making is
hierarchical. 17 This framework is then applied to refugee law and international
cooperation on migration control.
International cooperation, specifically on migration control, may be
analyzed through a legal pluralist understanding of refugee law. This approach
to understanding refugee law may explain tensions between different legal
orders and legal regimes, while at the same time offering a new way of thinking
about the issues of international cooperation and migration control. For instance,
the dominant narrative suggests that migration control is a collection of tools or
methods used by States to deter migrants from entering their territories and/or
14
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 109–11 (HARV. UNIV. PRESS 1995).
15
Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599–2659 (1997). See
also Harold Koh, Transnational Legal Process, YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 181–
207 (1996).
16
See, e.g., Paul S. Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301,
311 (2007). For a discussion of international and constructivism, see Jutta Brunnee,& Stephen Toope,
International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19–74 (2000).
17
Berman, supra note 16, at 309.
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gaining access to asylum procedures. 18 Some examples of these tools or methods
include visa regimes, carrier sanctions, third country agreements, and pushback
operations. 19 Still other scholars have contended that migration control measures
may be ways in which States circumvent their international law obligations,
including the principle of non-refoulement. 20 Some have even gone further to
assert that international law obligations such as the norm of non-refoulement
may be contracted out of through the use of bilateral agreements or agreements
with third States. 21 Examples of these bilateral agreements, whether formal or
informal, may include the EU-Turkey Agreement and the Italy-Libya
Memorandum of Understanding. 22 As compared with other migration control
measures, third country agreements may exacerbate the likelihood of claimants
being sent back to persecution, thus violating the principle of non-refoulement,
where these agreements permit the sending of claimants to a third State, without
an individual assessment as to the merits of their claims. 23
There is another way, however, to look at migration control measures.
International cooperation on migration control may reveal a State’s compliance
with legal norms at its core. For instance, State behavior, as in a State’s
compliance or non-compliance of norms, affect State practice, which in turn may
reveal what is custom when supported by opinio juris. In the same way, what is
deemed international custom may also influence State behavior. 24
III. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON MIGRATION CONTROL
This Article’s main thesis suggests that interactions among States; agents of
States; non-State actors; and international organizations in the local, national,
regional, and international arena form a dialogue that explains compliance
behavior. 25 A good example of this dialogue is international cooperation on
18

Hathaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 1.
Id.
20
Nula Frei & Constantin Hruschka, Circumventing Non-Refoulement or Fighting “Illegal
Migration”?, EU IMMIGR. & ASYLUM L. & POL’Y, Mar. 23, 2018.
21
William Worster, Contracting Out of Non-Refoulement Protections, 27 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 77, 103 (2017).
22
For further discussion of the EU-Turkey Statement, see Jenny Poon, EU-Turkey Deal: Violation
of, or Consistency with, International Law?, 1 EUROPEAN PAPERS 1195, 1195–1203 (2016). For further
discussion of the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, see Jenny Poon, Libya-EU Memorandum
of Understanding: Implications for Non-Refoulement and Compliance with International Human Rights
Law?, CAMBRIDGE INT’L L. J. BLOG (2017).
23
Poon, supra note 22.
24
See e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, Understanding Resemblance Between Modern and
Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 640–72 (2000).
25
Costello, supra note 12, at 316. It has been suggested, for example, that “the statist migration
19
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migration control. First, the tensions created by a legal pluralist society
encourage the legitimacy of legal norms. 26 Second, legitimacy of certain legal
norms encourages further compliance with the same legal norms, which may in
turn inform the establishment and preservation of customary norms of
international law. Third, regardless of whether these customary norms are
implemented into domestic law, the dialogue between and among actors at
varying levels are not static, but rather dynamic, and mutually influence the
respective norm compliance of the other.
A.

Norms as Legitimacy

Dialogue between States, agents of States, non-State actors, and
international organizations act to reinforce international law norms. Instead of
acting as passive observers, agents of States, non-State actors, and international
organizations all have roles to play in the local, national, regional, and
international arena, which legitimizes their respective role and significance at
each level. In an increasingly globalized era, where international cooperation
between States and non-State entities flourish, such as in third country
agreements and migration control on the high seas, the use of norms to legitimize
actors is readily seen. The dialogue among States and non-State entities can be
demonstrated in the most recent EU-Turkey Agreement and the Italy-Libya
Memorandum of Understanding.
Despite debates as to whether the EU-Turkey Statement is a formal “deal”
or an informal political agreement, the Statement itself is evidence of the
ongoing dialogue between State and non-State entities regarding international
cooperation on migration control. 27 For instance, some scholars assert that the
Statement was signed between each individual Member State of the EU, rather
than between the EU itself and Turkey, a non-EU country. 28 During the
negotiations for the EU-Turkey Statement, the Heads of State or Government of
the EU met with their Turkish counterpart on several occasions, including on

control assumption, which veils the human rights impacts of migration status and migration control
measures, is unsettled in this pluralist context.” Id.
26
See, e.g., Paul Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265,
1265–1306 (2006).
27
See Gloria Arribas, The EU-Turkey Statement, The Treaty-Making Process and Competent
Organs: Is the Statement an International Agreement?, 2 EUROPEAN PAPERS 303–09 (2017) (discussing
the debate on whether the EU-Turkey Statement is in fact a formal “deal”).
28
Id. (noting the general court’s determination that the EU-Turkey Statement has no binding effect
upon the EU). See also Case T-192/16, NF v. European Council, 2017.
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October 15, 2015, November 29, 2015, and March 7, 2016. 29 On March 8, 2016,
the joint services of the European Council and the Council of the European
Union published a Statement by the Heads of State or Government of the EU,
now known as the EU-Turkey Statement. 30 This EU-Turkey Statement reveals
dialogue between State and non-State entities, namely the interactions between,
inter alia: the EU, an international organization, and Turkey, a non-EU country;
Greece, a State, and agents of Greece and the UNHCR, an intergovernmental
organization; and EU agencies and other Member States. 31
More specifically, the EU-Turkey Statement provided that: “The EU, in
close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the
initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey . .
.” 32 The EU-Turkey Statement further stated that: “Turkey and Greece, assisted
by EU institutions and agencies, will take the necessary steps and agree any
necessary bilateral arrangements, including the presence of Turkish officials on
Greek islands and Greek officials in Turkey as from 20 March 2016 . . .” 33 It
was also stated in the EU-Turkey Statement that “[m]igrants arriving in the
Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be
processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum
Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR.” 34 The provisions within the
EU-Turkey Statement seems to suggest that ongoing dialogue between State and
non-State entities is essential to implementing the terms of the agreement.
As another example, the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding has
similar wording to suggest a dialogue between State and non-State entities in
furtherance of international cooperation on migration control. 35 For example,
the Memorandum of Understanding aims to reaffirm “the resolute determination
to cooperate in identifying urgent solutions to the issue of clandestine migrants
crossing Libya to reach Europe by sea . . .” 36 The Memorandum of
Understanding further states:
The Italian party commits to provide technical and technologic
support to the Libyan institutions in charge of the fight against illegal

29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

NF v. European Council, supra note 28, at ¶¶ 1–4.
Id. at ¶ 4.
See EU-Turkey Statement, supra note 3.
Id. at ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
Id. at ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Libya-EU MOU, supra note 3.
Id. at preamble (emphasis added).
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immigration, and that are represented by the border guard and the
coast guard of the Ministry of Defence and by the competent bodies
and departments of the Ministry of Home Affairs. 37

The Memorandum of Understanding even goes on to guarantee financial
commitment to the migration control efforts: “The Italian party provides for the
financing of the initiatives mentioned in this Memorandum […] besides making
use of available funds from the European Union, in respect of the laws in force
in the two countries.” 38
As both the provisions of the EU-Turkey Statement and the Italy-Libya
Memorandum of Understanding suggest, the ongoing dialogue between State
and non-State entities, such as intergovernmental organizations, agents of States,
and international organizations, reinforce international cooperation on migration
control. It is suggested further that not only do these dialogues reinforce
international cooperation on migration control, they are also methods by which
State and non-State entities attempt to legitimize the actions and omissions of
the other. First, international cooperation of migration control through the use of
third country agreements, such as the EU-Turkey Statement and the Italy-Libya
Memorandum of Understanding, mutually reinforce the EU and Italy campaigns
to fight “illegal” migration. 39 Second, mutual reinforcement of actions and
omissions has the dangerous potential of norm setting. 40 Third, when norms
become widespread and consistent, they have the potential to reveal what is
deemed customary, when supported by opinio juris, thereby influencing State
behavior. 41
B.

Norms as Compliance

Customary forms of international law may be reinforced by consistent and
widespread compliance of that norm over time. International cooperation on
migration control potentially permits States and non-State entities to establish
customary norms of practice by influencing what is deemed customary. This can

37

Id. at art. 1(C).
Id. at art. 4.
39
EU-Turkey Statement, supra note 3, at ¶ 3; Libya-EU MOU, supra note 3, at preamble.
40
See generally U.N. GAOR, First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International
Law, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/663 (May 17, 2013).
41
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark, Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands) Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 41 (Feb. 20). See also Roozbeh Baker,
Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUROPEAN J.
INT’L L. 173, 173–204 (2010).
38
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be done in a number of ways. First, consistent State practice through migration
control has the potential to encourage further State behavior of the same. Second,
consistent State practice of migration control has the potential to become
widespread where other States are incentivized to do the same through actions
or omissions. Third, consistent and widespread State practice of migration
control, supported by opinio juris, forms international custom, thus legitimizing
the legal norms in question as well as the actors behaving consistent with such
norms. These three propositions may again be evidenced by international
cooperation on migration control through the use of third country agreements,
namely, the EU-Turkey Statement and the Italy-Libya Memorandum of
Understanding.
Going back in history, examples from the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and the EU demonstrate how consistent State practice may
legitimize certain legal norms, potentially creating precedent for following these
same norms. The United States began to externalize migration control in the era
of former President Ronald Reagan. 42 The case involves an interdiction
agreement between the United States and Haiti, which authorized the U.S. Coast
Guard to interdict Haitian vessels on the high seas and to return the passengers
to Haiti. 43 In Sale v. Haitian Center, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Article
33 on the prohibition of refoulement did not prohibit the U.S. Coast Guard from
intercepting Haitian refugees before they reached the border. 44 This case was
subsequently decided against by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights in The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. U.S., where the
Commission reasoned:
[T]here has been extensive and virtually uniform adoption of the
policy of non-refoulement throughout the world. The policy of
interdicting Haitians based on their national origin […] and forcibly
returning them to Haiti without asylum interviews of any sort, clearly
violated the principle of non-refoulement. 45

42
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,324, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1981), reprinted in 8 USC § 1182 (1981). See
also Bill Frelick, Ian Kysel, & Jennifer Podkul, The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on
the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, 4 J. MIGRATION & HUMAN SECURITY 190, 190–220
(2016).
43
Interdiction Agreement Between the United States of America and Haiti, Sept. 23, 1981, 33
U.S.T. 3559, 3559–60. See also Frelick et al., supra note 43, at 199.
44
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
45
Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. U.S., Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95,
doc. 7 rev. ¶ 88 (1997).
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In the case of the United States, the legal norm in question pertains to the norm
of non-refoulement. While international law treaties, custom, jurisprudence, and
scholarly opinion have widely asserted the norm’s customary nature, the U.S.
Supreme Court has opined that non-refoulement does not apply outside of a
State’s territory. 46 It is this persistence in State practice, which follows the ruling
of the U.S. Supreme Court, that has the potential to set as custom—when also
supported by opinio juris—the non-recognition of the extraterritorial scope of
non-refoulement obligations that is worrisome. 47 Some scholars have even
suggested that “actual practice and opinio juris are seldom unequivocal in
rejecting extraterritorial application of the non-refoulement principle.” 48 The
example below from the United Kingdom may shed light on this assertion.
In the United Kingdom, the case of R. v. Immigration Officer at Prague
Airport (Ex Parte Roma Centre) involved the return of six Czech nationals of
Roma ethnic origin. 49 The British Court of Appeals held that States have no duty
to facilitate the arrival of refugees and that States are entitled to take active steps
to prevent their arrival. 50 In the judgment of the House of Lords, the majority
agreed with the Sale case as held by the U.S. Supreme Court, and decided that
“the prohibition of non-refoulement may only be invoked in respect of persons
who are already present in the territory of the contracting [S]tate, and that
[A]rticle 33 does not oblige it to admit any person who has not set foot there.”51
Similar to the situation in the United States, the House of Lords has held that
non-refoulement is only applicable within the territory of a State, rather than
being applicable extraterritorially. Further, the House of Lords has agreed with
the Sale case, which sets as a potentially dangerous precedent, consistent State
practice, supported by opinio juris, in the non-recognition of the
extraterritoriality of non-refoulement.
In the Australian example, the case of Tampa demonstrates State practice in
the area of migration control.52 The case involves the interdiction of 533 mainly
46
For the customary nature of the norm of non-refoulement, see CATHRYN COSTELLO & MICHELLE
FOSTER, NON-REFOULEMENT AS CUSTOM AND JUS COGENS? PUTTING THE PROHIBITION TO THE TEST,
273–327 (Netherlands Yearbook of Int’l L., 2015). As noted above, however, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has decided against the United States Supreme Court’s decision.
47
THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND
THE GLOBALISATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011).
48
Id.
49
R v. Immigr. Officer at Prague Airport [2004] UKHL 55, [2005] 2 AC (HL) 1 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
50
Id.
51
Id. at ¶ 70.
52
GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 47.
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Afghan asylum claimants on an Indonesian vessel. 53 Australia reached an
agreement with Papua New Guinea and Nauru to host the claimants while their
claims were examined. 54 The case was an attempt by Australia to avoid
processing asylum applications, rather than a strict circumvention of the
principle of non-refoulement. 55
In the situation of the EU, the case of Hirsi Jamaa involved the interception
of Somali and Eritrean migrants at sea by Italian authorities who had been
traveling from Libya and who were sent back to Libya. 56 The European Court
of Human Rights held that Italy violated Article 3 (prohibition against torture)
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) for its ill-treatment of
the migrants in Libya and subsequent repatriation of these migrants to Somalia
or Eritrea. 57 The case of Hirsi Jamaa is distinguished from the previous cases of
Banković, Medvedyv, and Al-Skeini, where in Hirsi, instead of de facto control,
de jure control is also recognized as decisive in establishing the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction capable of engaging a State’s obligations under the
ECHR. 58 However, despite this difference, in all four cases, the Strasbourg court
held that, only in exceptional cases, will it recognize that the exercise of
jurisdiction can fall outside of a State’s territory within the meaning of Article 1
of the ECHR. Again, similar to the American and British examples, the
European case suggests that jurisdiction outside of a State’s territory is not prima
facie recognized by courts. This example and others like it set a dangerous
precedent where norms are interpreted by courts in such a way that reinforces
the State practice, when supported by opinio juris, that is becoming widespread
for a norm to rise to the level of customary law.
C. Norms as Dialogue
The dialogues between and among actors at varying levels are not static, but
dynamic, and mutually influence the respective norm compliance of the other.
The assertion has been made by some scholars that judicial dialogue exists to
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foster interaction among different legal orders and legal regimes—and in an
increasingly pluralist society. 59 It has also been contended by scholars that this
judicial dialogue may extend to all actors within the community of international
lawyers. 60 There is no reason why this dialogue cannot extend to actors beyond
the community of international lawyers, and to non-State entities,
intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, and beyond.
Further, this Article argues that the dialogue between State and non-State entities
at the local, national, regional, and international levels is increasingly important
in norm formation, interpretation, compliance, and enforcement in today’s
globalized world.
No dialogue is one-way. 61 Dialogue between State and non-State entities has
the potential to foster the compliance of norms through cooperation, negotiation,
and facilitation of migration control activities. 62 Examples from the third
country agreements, such as the EU-Turkey Statement and the Italy-Libya
Memorandum of Understanding, demonstrate how State and non-State entities
increasingly cooperate, negotiate, and facilitate migration control activities
internationally.
The EU-Turkey Statement evidences cooperation between State and nonState entities, such as the EU as an international organization, and Turkey. 63 This
agreement also involves multiple actors and a complex web of relationships
among the actors. For example, in the EU-Turkey Statement, there is mention
that Turkey and Greece will be assisted by EU institutions and agencies, along
with the presence of Turkish officials and Greek officials. 64 Also, paragraph 9
provides that “the EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint
endeavour to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria.” 65 This Article
suggests that this type of cooperation between State and non-State entities
reveals an ongoing dialogue between the actors involved, which may have an
effect on the formation of and compliance with norms. The Italy-Libya
Memorandum of Understanding evidences similar cooperation efforts among
59
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State and non-State entities. First, the preamble to the Memorandum of
Understanding specifies that the parties reaffirm “the resolute determination to
cooperate in identifying urgent solutions to the issue of clandestine migrants
crossing Libya to reach Europe by sea.” 66 Second, Article 1 suggests that the
involved parties “commit themselves to: start cooperation initiatives . . . in order
to stem the illegal migrants’ fluxes and face their consequences.” 67 Third, Italy
and Libya have signed the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation,
which is a bilateral agreement between the two countries on migration. 68
Besides cooperation between State and non-State entities, negotiation also
played a major role in evidencing dialogue, which could potentially strengthen
norm formation and compliance. For instance, in order to negotiate the EUTurkey Statement, the EU Heads of State or Government have held several highlevel meetings with their Turkish counterpart on several occasions. 69 The ItalyLibya Memorandum of Understanding also recalled, in its preamble, former
negotiations, which resulted in the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and
Cooperation between Italy and Libya. 70 Evidence of negotiations taking place
between State and non-State entities can also be seen through examples of the
EU’s presence at the EU-Africa Summit of 2014, which led to the adoption of
the EU-Africa Declaration on Migration and Mobility, and the Joint Statement
adopted in Kazan in 2010 between the EU and Russian Federation. 71
As shown briefly, dialogue not only exists between States and non-State
entities; there are also ongoing exchanges which permit different actors with
multiple roles to mutually influence the formation of, and compliance with, legal
norms. International cooperation on migration control is one example that
demonstrates how this type of dialogue may inform the reasons for or against
State compliance with legal norms.
IV. PUTTING IT TOGETHER: A LEGAL PLURALIST APPROACH TO
MIGRATION CONTROL

International law has traditionally been a field involving State-to-State
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relations. 72 However, the rise of non-governmental organizations, international
bodies, multinational corporations, and activist communities began to take place
during the post-WWII era. 73 Each of these actors then become involved in norm
formation and development. 74 Perhaps, a new way of approaching the migration
control thesis, that is, the deterrence of claimants from reaching the shores of
sovereign territories to claim asylum, is not through a top-down sovereigntist
model, but through a legal pluralist approach, where the underlying rationale for
State compliance to relevant legal norms is done through ongoing mutual
dialectical exchanges between State and non-State entities. 75 This Article has
suggested that norm formation and compliance may be done through these
mutual dialectical exchanges between State and non-State entities, which has the
effect of legitimizing legal norms, furthering norm compliance, and promoting
additional dialectical exchanges.
Scholars have also argued that non-State entities have the potential to
develop norms and are involved in international lawmaking. 76 While one of the
main criticisms of international law today remains the lack of enforcement
mechanisms, a legal pluralist answer will be that lawmaking need not fall under
the domain of strictly State-to-State relations, but also through non-State
entities. 77 It is by accepting the possibility that non-State entities may be
involved in norm formation and in the process of furthering norm compliance
that a legal pluralist approach may inform a new understanding of international
cooperation on migration control and relevant policies to enhance protection
standards for stakeholders. This potential to rethink international cooperation on
migration control has two possible implications. First, if non-State entities can
contribute towards norm formation and incentivize States to comply with legal
norms, the whole playing field changes. Instead of policies directed toward
pushing States to comply with legal norms, perhaps policies may also
incorporate elements where non-State entities may be involved. For example,
one way to involve non-State entities may be to permit them to be involved in
negotiations of State policies regarding migration control. Second, if non-State
entities have a role in norm formation and compliance on migration control, this
has the potential of becoming a significant role, given that norm formation may
be attributable to non-State entities. The ability to contribute toward norm
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formation may also raise the issue of responsibility and complicity surrounding
a non-State entity’s actions and omissions in committing internationally
wrongful acts. 78 International organizations, such as the EU, and other non-State
entities, such as EU institutions and agencies as well as their agents, all have a
shared responsibility toward norm development. This new understanding of
international cooperation on migration control suggests that proper training and
legal education may help to inform better practices and guidance toward the
implementation of legal norms.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Article has suggested a potential new way to approach the issue of
international cooperation on migration control. It involves looking at migration
control through the lens of a legal pluralist understanding of refugee law. A legal
pluralist approach to refugee law would recognize the multiplicity of actors
involved in a migration control scenario by reimagining the role of non-State
entities, such that they can also contribute toward motivating State behavior. In
essence, the understanding of international law is no longer hierarchical or topdown, but intersectional, so that the exchanges of dialogues between State and
non-State entities (including international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, and transnational corporations) may influence, reinforce, and
contribute to norm formation, interpretation, compliance, and enforcement.
Such an approach would also consider that the complexities and significance of
each of their roles, while distinct, are inevitably intertwined. This Article has
further posited that State and non-State entities maintain an ongoing dialectical
exchange, which helps to further legitimize and incentivize compliance, while
encouraging more dialogue on the compliance of legal norms. This type of
dialogue is shown through examples of third country agreements, such as the
EU-Turkey Statement and the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding.
With the increasing trend toward international cooperation on migration
control, this Article has attempted to present a nuanced way of thinking about
norm compliance and migration control in hopes that it may contribute to better
informed policies to create higher standards of protection for stakeholders in the
not too distant future.
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